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Abstract
Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et al. as a model of
networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact in pairs but
with no control over their own movement. A collection of anonymous agents,
modeled by ﬁnite automata, interact pairwise according to some rules that
update their states.
The model has been considered as a computational model in several pa-
pers. Input values are initially distributed among the agents, and the agents
must eventually converge to the the correct output. Predicates on the initial
conﬁgurations that can be computed by such protocols have been character-
ized under various hypotheses. The model has initially been motivated by
sensor-networks, but it can be seen more generally as a model of networks
of anonymous agents interacting pairwise. This includes sensor networks,
ad-hoc networks, or models from chemistry.
In an orthogonal way, several distributed systems have been termed in
literature as being realizations of games in the sense of game theory. In
this paper, we investigate under which conditions population protocols, or
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Preprint submitted to Theoretical Computer Science May 15, 2009more generally pairwise interaction rules, can be considered as the result of a
symmetric game. We prove that not all rules can be considered as symmetric
games.We characterize the computational power of symmetric games. We
prove that they have very limited power: they can count until 2, compute
majority, but they can not even count until 3.
As a side eﬀect of our study, we also prove that any population protocol
can be simulated by a symmetric one (but not necessarily a game).
Key words: Population Protocols, Computation Theory, Distributed
Computing, Algorithmic Game Theory
1. Introduction
The computational power of networks of anonymous resource-limited mo-
bile agents has been investigated recently.
In particular, Angluin et al. proposed in [2] a model of distributed compu-
tations. In this model, called population protocols, ﬁnitely many ﬁnite-state
agents interact in pairs chosen by an adversary. Each interaction has the
eﬀect of updating the state of the two agents according to a joint transition
function.
A protocol is said to (stably) compute a predicate on the initial states of
the agents if, in any fair execution, after ﬁnitely many interactions, all agents
reach a common output that corresponds to the value of the predicate.
The model was originally proposed to model computations realized by
sensor networks in which passive agents are carried along by other entities.
The canonical example of [2] corresponds to sensors attached to a ﬂock of
birds and that must be programmed to check some global properties, like
determining whether more than 5% of the population has elevated temper-
ature. Motivating scenarios also include models of the propagation of trust
[9].
Much of the work so far on population protocols has concentrated on
characterizing which predicates on the initial states can be computed in dif-
ferent variants of the model and under various assumptions. In particular,
the predicates computable by the unrestricted population protocols from [2]
have been characterized as being precisely the semi-linear predicates, that is
those predicates on counts of input agents deﬁnable in ﬁrst-order Presburger
arithmetic [20]. Semi-linearity was shown to be suﬃcient in [2] and necessary
in [3].
2Variants considered so far include restriction to one-way communications,
restriction to particular interaction graphs, to random interactions, with pos-
sibly various kind of failures of agents. Solutions to classical problems of
distributed algorithmics have also been considered in this model. Refer to
[4] for a survey and a complete discussion.
The population protocol model shares many features with other models
already considered in the literature. In particular, models of pairwise interac-
tions have been used to study the propagation of diseases [14], or rumors [8].
In chemistry, the chemical master equation has been justiﬁed using (stochas-
tic) pairwise interactions between the ﬁnitely many molecules [17, 13]. In
that sense, the model of population protocols may be considered as funda-
mental in several ﬁelds of study, since it appears as soon as anonymous agents
interact pairwise.
In an orthogonal way, pairwise interactions between ﬁnite-state agents are
sometimes motivated by the study of the dynamics of particular two-player
games from game theory. For example, paper [10] considers the dynamics
of the so-called PAV LOV behavior in the iterated prisoner lemma. Several
results about the time of convergence of this particular dynamics towards the
stable state can be found in [10], and [11], for rings, and complete graphs.
The purpose of this article is to better understand whether and when
pairwise interactions, and hence population protocols, can be considered as
the result of a game. We want to understand if restricting to rules that come
from a symmetric game is a limitation, and in particular whether restricting
to rules that can be termed PAV LOV in the spirit of [10] is a limitation. We
do so by giving solutions to several basic problems using rules of interactions
associated to a symmetric game, and by characterizing they power: We prove
that they can count until 2, they can compute MAJORITY , but they can
not even count until 3.
As such protocols must also be symmetric, we are also discussing whether
restricting to symmetric rules in population protocols is a limitation. We
prove that any population protocol can be simulated by a symmetric one
(but not necessarily a game).
In Section 2, we brieﬂy recall population protocols. In Section 3, we recall
some basics from game theory. In Section 4, we discuss how a game can be
turned into a dynamics, and introduce the notion of Pavlovian population
protocol. In Section 5 we prove that any symmetric deterministic 2-states
population protocol is Pavlovian, and that the problem of computing the OR,
AND, as well as the leader election and majority problem admit Pavlovian
3solutions. We then characterize there power by proving that they can count
until 2, but they can not count until 3 in Section 6. We prove that symmet-
ric population protocols, unlike the restricted class of Pavlovian population
protocols can compute all semi-linear predicate in Section 7.
Related work. Population protocols have been introduced in [2], and proved
to compute all semi-linear predicates. They have been proved not to be able
to compute more in [3]. Various restrictions on the initial model have been
considered up to now. An (almost) up to date survey can be found in [4].
Variants include discussions about the inﬂuence of removing the assump-
tion of two-way interaction: One-way interaction models include variants
where agents communicate by anonymous message-passing, with immediate
delivery or delayed delivery, or where agents can record it has sent a message,
or queue incoming messages [1]. However, as far as we know, the constraint
of restricting to symmetric rules has not been yet explicitly considered, nor
restricting to rules that correspond to games in the population protocol lit-
erature.
More generally, population protocols arise as soon as populations of anony-
mous agents interact in pairs. Our original motivation was to consider rules
corresponding to two-players games, and population protocols arose quite
incidentally. The main advantage of the [2] settings is that it provides a
clear understanding of what is called a computation by the model. Many
distributed systems have been described as the result of games, but as far as
we know there has not been attempts to characterize what can be computed
by games in the spirit of this computational model.
In this paper, we turn two players games into dynamics over agents, by
considering PAV LOV behavior. This is inspired by [10, 11, 16] that con-
sider the dynamics of a particular set of rules termed the PAV LOV behav-
ior in the iterated prisoner lemma. The PAV LOV behavior is sometimes
also termed WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT [18, 5]. Notice, that we extended
it from two-strategies two-players games to n-strategies two-players games,
whereas above references only talk about two-strategies two-players games,
and mostly of the iterated prisoner lemma.
This is clearly not the only way to associate a dynamic to a game. They
are several famous classical approaches: The ﬁrst consists in repeating games:
see for example [19, 6]. The second in using models from evolutionary game
theory: refer to [15, 21] for a presentation of this latter approach. The ap-
proach considered here falls in method that consider dynamics obtained by
4selecting at each step some players and let them play a ﬁxed game. Alter-
natives to PAV LOV behavior could include MY OPIC dynamics (at each
step each player chooses the best response to previously played strategy by
its adversary), or the well-known and studied FICTIOUS −PLAY ER dy-
namics (at each step each player chooses the best response to the statistics
of the past history of strategies played by its adversary). We refer to [12, 6]
for a presentation of results known about the properties of the obtained dy-
namics according to the properties of the underlying game. This is clearly
non-exhaustive, and we refer to [5] for an incredible zoology of possible be-
haviors for the particular iterated prisoner lemma game, with discussions of
their compared merits in experimental tournaments.
We obtain a characterization of the power of Pavlovian population proto-
cols in terms of closure properties that show that they can count until 2, but
not until 3. Notice that several variants of (one-way) population protocols
have been characterized in [1] in a COUNTk hierarchy. The class obtained
here seems close to the COUNT2 level of this latter hierarchy [1]. However,
on one hand, this is not exactly this class (for example MAJORITY is com-
putable but not in the COUNT2 level), and on the other hand, as no class
there is formally proved to correspond to COUNT2, this shows that the class
considered here is diﬀerent, and not reducible to the variants of [1].
Notice that a preliminary version of this article has been presented in
Complexity of Simple Programs CSP’08. Compared to this conference ver-
sion, we simpliﬁed some constructions, we added a few protocols, we extended
deeply related work discussions, and mainly, we solved the statements con-
jectured there: we provide here a characterization of the power of Pavlovian
population protocols, whereas it was open at the time of the presentation of
this preliminary version.
2. Population Protocols
A protocol [2, 4] is given by (Q,Σ,ι,ω,δ) with the following components.
Q is a ﬁnite set of states. Σ is a ﬁnite set of input symbols. ι : Σ → Q
is the initial state mapping, and ω : Q → {0,1} is the individual output
function. δ ⊆ Q4 is a joint transition relation that describes how pairs of
agents can interact. Relation δ is sometimes described by listing all possi-
ble interactions using the notation (q1,q2) → (q0
1,q0
2), or even the notation
q1q2 → q0
1q0
2, for (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ (with the convention that (q1,q2) → (q1,q2)
when no rule is speciﬁed with (q1,q2) in the left-hand side). The protocol
5is termed deterministic if for all pairs (q1,q2) there is only one pair (q0
1,q0
2)
with (q1,q2) → (q0
1,q0
2). In that case, we write δ1(q1,q2) for the unique q0
1 and
δ2(q1,q2) for the unique q0
2.
Notice that, in general, rules can be non-symmetric: if (q1,q2) → (q0
1,q0
2),
it does not necessarily follow that (q2,q1) → (q0
2,q0
1).
Computations of a protocol proceed in the following way. The computa-
tion takes place among n agents, where n ≥ 2. A conﬁguration of the system
can be described by a vector of all the agents’ states. The state of each
agent is an element of Q. Because agents with the same states are indistin-
guishable, each conﬁguration can be summarized as an unordered multiset
of states, and hence of elements of Q.
Each agent is given initially some input value from Σ: Each agent’s initial
state is determined by applying ι to its input value. This determines the
initial conﬁguration of the population.
An execution of a protocol proceeds from the initial conﬁguration by
interactions between pairs of agents. Suppose that two agents in state q1
and q2 meet and have an interaction. They can change into state q0
1 and q0
2 if
(q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) is in the transition relation δ. If C and C0 are two conﬁgurations,
we write C → C0 if C0 can be obtained from C by a single interaction of two
agents: this means that C contains two states q1 and q2 and C0 is obtained by
replacing q1 and q2 by q0
1 and q0
2 in C, where (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ. An execution
of the protocol is an inﬁnite sequence of conﬁgurations C0,C1,C2,···, where
C0 is an initial conﬁguration and Ci → Ci+1 for all i ≥ 0. An execution is
fair if for all conﬁgurations C that appear inﬁnitely often in the execution,
if C → C0 for some conﬁguration C0, then C0 appears inﬁnitely often in the
execution.
At any point during an execution, each agent’s state determines its out-
put at that time. If the agent is in state q, its output value is ω(q). The
conﬁguration output is 0 (respectively 1) if all the individual outputs are
0 (respectively 1). If the individual outputs are mixed 0s and 1s then the
output of the conﬁguration is undeﬁned.
Let p be a predicate over multisets of elements of Σ. Predicate p can
be considered as a function whose range is {0,1} and whose domain is the
collection of these multisets. The predicate is said to be computed by the
protocol if, for every multiset I, and every fair execution that starts from
the initial conﬁguration corresponding to I, the output value of every agent
eventually stabilizes to p(I).
Multisets of elements of Σ are in clear bijection with elements of N|Σ|: a
6multiset over Σ can be identiﬁed by a vector of |Σ| components, where each
component represents the multiplicity of the corresponding element of Σ in
this multiset. It follows that predicates can also be considered as functions
whose range is {0,1} and whose domain is N|Σ|.
The following was then proved in [2, 3].
Theorem 1 ([2, 3]). A predicate is computable in the population protocol
model if and only if it is semilinear.
Recall that semilinear sets are known to correspond to predicates on
counts of input agents deﬁnable in ﬁrst-order Presburger arithmetic [20].
We will use the following notation as in [1]: the set of all functions from
a set X to a set Y is denoted by Y X. Let Σ be a ﬁnite non-empty set. For
all f,g ∈ RE, we deﬁne the usual vector space operations
(f + g)(σ) = f(σ) + g(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ
(f − g)(σ) = f(σ) − g(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ
(cf)(σ) = cf(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ,c ∈ R
(f.g)(σ) =
P
σ f(σ)g(σ).
Abusing notation as in [1], we will write σ for the function σ(σ0) = [σ =
σ0], for all σ0 ∈ Σ, where [condition] is 1 if condition is true, 0 otherwise.
3. Game Theory
We now recall the simplest concepts from Game Theory. We focus on
non-cooperative games, with complete information, in extensive form.
The simplest game is made up of two players, called I and II, with a
ﬁnite set of options, called pure strategies, Strat(I) and Strat(II). Denote
by Ai,j (respectively: Bi,j) the score for player I (resp. II) when I uses
strategy i ∈ Strat(I) and II uses strategy j ∈ Strat(II).
The scores are given by n×m matrices A and B, where n and m are the
cardinality of Strat(I) and Strat(II). The game is termed symmetric if A
is the transpose of B: this implies that n = m, and we can assume without
loss of generality that Strat(I) = Strat(II).
In this paper, we will restrict to symmetric games.
Example 1 (Prisoner’s dilemma). The case where A and B are the following
matrices
7A =

R S
T P

,B =

R T
S P

with T > R > P > S and 2R > T +S, is called the prisoner’s dilemma. We
denote by C (for cooperation) the ﬁrst pure strategy, and by D (for defection)
the second pure strategy of each player.
As the game is symmetric, matrix A and B can also be denoted by:
Opponent
C D
Player
C R S
D T P
A strategy x ∈ Strat(I) is said to be a best response to strategy y ∈
Strat(II), denoted by x ∈ BR(y) if
Az,y ≤ Ax,y (1)
for all strategies z ∈ Strat(I).
A pair (x,y) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if x ∈ BR(y) and y ∈ BR(x).
A pure Nash equilibrium does not always exist.
In other words, two strategies (x,y) form a Nash equilibrium if in that
state neither of the players has a unilateral interest to deviate from it.
Example 2. On the example of the prisoner’s dilemma, BR(y) = D for all
y, and BR(x) = D for all x. So (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and
it is pure. In it, each player has score P. The well-known paradox is that
if they had played (C,C) (cooperation) they would have had score R, that is
more. The social optimum (C,C), is diﬀerent from the equilibrium that is
reached by rational players (D,D), since in any other state, each player fears
that the adversary plays C.
We will also introduce the following deﬁnition: Given some strategy x0 ∈
Strat(I), a strategy x ∈ Strat(I) is said to be a best response to strategy
y ∈ Strat(II) among those diﬀerent from x0, denoted by x ∈ BR6=x0(y) if
Az,y ≤ Ax,y (2)
for all strategy z ∈ Strat(I),z 6= x0.
Of course, the roles of II and I can be inverted in the previous deﬁnition.
8There are two main approaches to discuss dynamics of games. The ﬁrst
consists in repeating games [19, 6]. The second in using models from evo-
lutionary game theory. Refer to [15, 21] for a presentation of this latter
approach.
Repeating Games. Repeating k times a game, is equivalent to extending the
space of choices into Strat(I)k and Strat(II)k: player I (respectively II)
chooses his or her action x(t) ∈ Strat(I), (resp. y(t) ∈ Strat(II)) at time
t for t = 1,2,··· ,k. Hence, this is equivalent to a two-player game with
respectively nk and mk choices for players.
To avoid confusion, we will call actions the choices x(t),y(t) of each player
at a given time, and strategies the sequences X = x(1),··· ,x(k) and Y =
y(1),··· ,y(k), that is to say the strategies for the global game.
If the game is repeated an inﬁnite number of times, a strategy becomes a
function from integers to the set of actions, and the game is still equivalent
to a two-player game1.
Behaviors. In practice, player I (respectively II) has to solve the following
problem at each time t: given the history of the game up to now, that is to
say
Xt−1 = x(1),··· ,x(t − 1)
and
Yt−1 = y(1),··· ,y(t − 1)
what should I (resp. II) play at time t? In other words, how to choose
x(t) ∈ Strat(I)? (resp. y(t) ∈ Strat(II)?)
Is is natural to suppose that this is given by some behavior rules:
x(t) = f(Xt−1,Yt−1),
y(t) = g(Xt−1,Yt−1)
for some particular functions f and g.
1but whose matrices are inﬁnite.
9The Speciﬁc Case of the Prisoner’s Lemma. The question of the best behav-
ior rule to use for the prisoner lemma gave birth to an important literature.
In particular, after the book [5], that describes the results of tournaments of
behavior rules for the iterated prisoner lemma, and that argues that there
exists a best behavior rule called TIT − FOR − TAT. This consists in co-
operating at the ﬁrst step, and then do the same thing as the adversary at
subsequent times.
A lot of other behaviors, most of them with very picturesque names have
been proposed and studied: see for example [5].
Among possible behaviors there is PAV LOV behavior: in the iterated
prisoner lemma, a player cooperates if and only if both players opted for the
same alternative in the previous move. This name [5, 16, 18] stems from the
fact that this strategy embodies an almost reﬂex-like response to the payoﬀ:
it repeats its former move if it was rewarded by R or T points, but switches
behavior if it was punished by receiving only P or S points. Refer to [18] for
some study of this strategy in the spirit of Axelrod’s tournaments.
The PAV LOV behavior can also be termed WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT
since if the play on the previous round results in a success, then the agent
plays the same strategy on the next round. Alternatively, if the play resulted
in a failure the agent switches to another action [5, 18].
Going From 2 Players to N Players. PAV LOV behavior is Markovian: a
behavior f is Markovian, if f(Xt−1,Yt−1) depends only on x(t−1) and y(t−1).
From such a behavior, it is easy to obtain a distributed dynamic. For
example, let’s follow [10], for the prisoner’s dilemma.
Suppose that we have a connected graph G = (V,E), with N vertices.
The vertices correspond to players. An instantaneous conﬁguration of the
system is given by an element of {C,D}N, that is to say by the state C or
D of each vertex. Hence, there are 2N conﬁgurations.
At each time t, one chooses randomly and uniformly one edge (i,j) of the
graph. At this moment, players i and j play the prisoner dilemma with the
PAV LOV behavior. It is easy to see that this corresponds to executing the
following rules:

  
  
CC → CC
CD → DD
DC → DD
DD → CC.
(3)
10What is the ﬁnal state reached by the system? The underlying model
is a very large Markov chain with 2N states. The state E∗ = {C}N is
absorbing. If the graph G does not have any isolated vertex, this is the
unique absorbing state, and there exists a sequence of transformations that
transforms any state E into this state E∗. As a consequence, from well-known
classical results in Markov chain theory, whatever the initial conﬁguration is,
with probability 1, the system will eventually be in state E∗ [7]. The system
is self-stabilizing.
Several results about the time of convergence towards this stable state
can be found in [10], and [11], for rings, and complete graphs.
What is interesting in this example is that it shows how to go from a
game, and a behavior to a distributed dynamic on a graph, and in particular
to a population protocol when the graph is a complete graph.
4. From Games To Population Protocols
In the spirit of the previous discussion, to any symmetric game, we can
associate a population protocol as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Associating a Protocol to a Game). Assume a symmetric
two-player game is given. Let ∆ be some threshold.
The protocol associated to the game is a population protocol whose set of
states is Q, where Q = Strat(I) = Strat(II) is the set of strategies of the
game, and whose transition rules δ are given as follows:
(q1,q2,q
0
1,q
0
2) ∈ δ
where
• q0
1 = q1 when Mq1,q2 ≥ ∆
• q0
1 ∈ BR6=q1(q2) when Mq1,q2 < ∆
and
• q0
2 = q2 when Mq2,q1 ≥ ∆
• q0
2 ∈ BR6=q2(q1) when Mq2,q1 < ∆,
where M is the matrix of the game.
11Remark 1. By subtracting ∆ to each entry of the matrix M, we can assume
without loss of generality that ∆ = 0. We will do so from now on.
Deﬁnition 2 (Pavlovian Population Protocol). A population protocol is Pavlo-
vian if it can be obtained from a game as above.
Remark 2. Clearly a Pavlovian population protocol must be symmetric: in-
deed, whenever (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ, one has (q2,q1,q0
2,q0
1) ∈ δ.
5. Some Speciﬁc Pavlovian Protocols
We now discuss whether assuming protocols Pavlovian is a restriction.
We start by an easy consideration.
Theorem 2. Any symmetric deterministic 2-states population protocol is
Pavlovian.
Proof. Consider a deterministic symmetric 2-states population protocol. Note
Q = {+,−} its set of states. Its transition function can be written as follows:

  
  
++ → α++α++
+− → α+−α−+
−+ → α−+α+−
−− → α−−α−−
(4)
for some α++,α+−,α−+,α−−.
This corresponds to the symmetric game given by the following pay-oﬀ
matrix M
Opponent
+ -
Player
+ β++ β+−
- β−+ β−−
where for all q1,q2 ∈ {+,−},
• βq1q2 = 1 if αq1q2 = q1,
• βq1q2 = −1 otherwise.
12Unfortunately, not all rules correspond to a game.
Proposition 1. Some symmetric population protocols are not Pavlovian.
Proof. Consider for example a deterministic 3-states population protocol
with set of states Q = {q0,q1,q2} and a joint transition function δ such
that δ1(q0,q0) = q1, δ1(q1,q0) = q2 , δ1(q2,q0) = q0.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a 2-player game corresponding
to this 3-states population protocol. Consider its payoﬀ matrix M. Let
M(q0,q0) = β0, M(q1,q0) = β1 , M(q2,q0) = β2. We must have β0 ≥ ∆ =
0,β1 ≥ ∆ = 0 since all agents that interact with an agent in state q0 must
change their state. Now, since q0 changes to q1, q1 must be a strictly better
response to q0 than q2: hence, we must have β1 > β2. In a similar way, since
q1 changes to q2, we must have β2 > β0 , and since q2 changes to q0, we must
have β0 > β1. From β1 > β2 > β0 we reach a contradiction.
This indeed motivates the following study, where we discuss which prob-
lems admit a Pavlovian solution.
5.1. Basic Protocols
Proposition 2. There is a Pavlovian protocol that computes the logical OR
(resp. AND) of input bits.
Proof. Consider the following protocol to compute OR,

  
  
01 → 11
10 → 11
00 → 00
11 → 11
(5)
and the following protocol to compute AND,

  
  
01 → 00
10 → 00
00 → 00
11 → 11
(6)
Since they are both deterministic 2-states population protocols, they are
Pavlovian.
13Remark 3. Notice that OR (respectively AND) protocol corresponds to the
predicate [x.0 ≥ 1] (resp. [x.0 = 0]), where x is the input. A simple change
of notation yields a protocol to compute [x.σ ≥ 1] and [x.σ = 0] for any input
symbol σ.
Remark 4. All previous protocols are “naturally broadcasting” i.e., eventu-
ally all agents agree on some (the correct) value. With previous deﬁnitions
(which are the classical ones for population protocols), the following protocol
does not compute the XOR or input bits, or equivalently does not compute
predicate [x.1 ≡ 1 (mod 2)].

  
  
01 → 01
10 → 10
00 → 00
11 → 00
(7)
Indeed, the answer is not eventually known by all the agents. It computes
the XOR in a weaker form i.e., eventually, all agents will be in state 0, if
the XOR of input bits is 0, or eventually only one agent will be in state 1,
if the XOR of input bits is 1.
Proposition 3. There is a Pavlovian protocol that computes the threshold
predicate [x.σ ≥ 2], which is true when there are at least 2 occurrences of
input symbol σ in the input x.
Proof. The following protocol is a solution taking
• Σ = {0,σ}, Q = {0,σ,2},
• ω(0) = ω(σ) = 0,
• ω(2) = 1.

            
            
00 → 00
0σ → 0σ
σ0 → σ0
02 → 22
20 → 22
σσ → 22
σ2 → 22
2σ → 22
22 → 22
(8)
14Indeed, if there is at least two σ, then by fairness and by the rule number
6, they will ultimately be changed into two 2s. Then 2s will turn all other
agents into 2s. Now, this is the only way to create a 2.
This is a Pavlovian protocol since it corresponds to the following payoﬀ
matrix.
Opponent
0 σ 2
Player
0 0 0 −1
σ 0 −1 −1
2 1 1 1
Hence, Pavlovian population protocols can count until 2. We will prove
later on that they can not count until 3.
5.2. Leader Election
The classical solution [2] to the leader election problem (starting from a
conﬁguration with ≥ 1 leaders, eventually exactly one leader survives) is the
following:

  
  
LL → LN
LN → LN
NL → NL
NN → NN
(9)
Notice that we use the terminology “leader election” as in [2] for this
protocol, but that it may be considered more as a“mutual exclusion”protocol.
Unfortunately, this protocol is non-symmetric, and hence non-Pavlovian.
Remark 5. Actually, the problem is with the ﬁrst rule, since one wants two
leaders to become only one. If the two leaders are identical, this is clearly
problematic with symmetric rules.
However, the leader election problem can actually be solved by a Pavlo-
vian protocol, at the price of a less trivial protocol.
15Proposition 4. The following Pavlovian protocol solves the leader election
problem, as soon as the population is of size ≥ 3.

            
            
L1L2 → L1N
L1N → NL2
L2N → NL1
NN → NN
L2L1 → NL1
NL1 → L2N
NL2 → L1N
L1L1 → L2L2
L2L2 → L1L1
(10)
Proof. Indeed, starting from a conﬁguration containing not only Ns, eventu-
ally after some time conﬁgurations will have exactly one leader, that is one
agent in state L1 or L2.
Indeed, the ﬁrst rule and the ﬁfth rule decrease strictly the number of
leaders whenever there are more than two leaders. Now the other rules, pre-
serve the number of leaders, and are made such that an L1 can always be
transformed into an L2 and vice-versa, and hence are made such that a con-
ﬁguration where ﬁrst or ﬁfth rule applies can always be reached whenever
there are more than two leaders. The fact that it solves the leader elec-
tion problem then follows from the hypothesis of fairness in the deﬁnition of
computations.
This is a Pavlovian protocol, since it corresponds to the following payoﬀ
matrix.
Opponent
L1 L2 N
Player
L1 −3 0 −3
L2 −1 −3 −3
N −2 −3 0
5.3. Majority
Proposition 5. The majority problem (given some population of input sym-
bols σ and σ0, determine whether there are more σ than σ0) can be solved by
a Pavlovian population protocol.
16Remark 6. If one prefers, the predicate [x.σ ≥ x.σ0], where σ and σ0 are two
input symbols, and x is the input, is computable by a Pavlovian population
protocol.
Proof. We claim that the following protocol outputs 1 if there are more σ
than σ0 in the initial conﬁguration and 0 otherwise,

          
          
NY → Y Y
Y N → Y Y
Nσ → Y σ
σN → σY
Y σ0 → Nσ0
σ0Y → σ0N
σσ0 → NY
σ0σ → Y N
(11)
taking
• Σ = {σ,σ0},Q = {σ,σ0,Y,N},
• ω(σ) = ω(Y ) = 1,
• ω(σ0) = ω(N) = 0.
In this protocol, the states Y and N are“neutral”elements for our pred-
icate but they should be understood as Yes and No. They are the“answers”
to the question: are there more 0s than 1s.
This protocol is made such that the numbers of σ and σ0 are preserved
except when a σ meets a σ0. In that latter case, the two agents are deleted
and transformed into a Y and a N.
If there are initially strictly more σ than σ0, from the fairness condition,
each σ0 will be paired with a σ and at some point no σ0 will left. By fairness
and since there is still at least a σ, a conﬁguration containing only σ and
Y s will be reached. Since in such a conﬁguration, no rule can modify the
state of any agent, and since the output is deﬁned and equals to 1 in such a
conﬁguration, the protocol is correct in this case
By symmetry, one can show that the protocol outputs 0 if there are
initially strictly more σ0 than σ.
Suppose now that initially, there are exactly the same number of σ and
σ0. By fairness, there exists a step when no more agents in the state σ or σ0
17left. Note that at the moment where the last σ is matched with the last σ0,
a Y is created. Since this Y can be “broadcasted” over the Ns, in the ﬁnal
conﬁguration all agents are in the state Y and thus the output is correct.
This protocol is Pavlovian, since it corresponds to the following payoﬀ
matrix.
Opponent
N Y σ σ0
N 1 −1 −1 1
Player Y 0 1 1 −1
σ 0 0 0 −1
σ0 0 0 −1 0
6. Bounds on the Power of Pavlovian Population Protocols
We proved that predicates [x.σ = 0], [x.σ ≥ 1], [x.σ ≥ 2] can be computed
by some Pavlovian population protocols, as well as [x.σ ≥ x.σ0].
It is clear that the subset of the predicates computable by Pavlovian
population protocols is closed by negation: just switch the value of the indi-
vidual output function of a protocol computing a predicate to get a protocol
computing its negation.
Notice that, unlike what happens for general population protocols, com-
posing Pavlovian population protocols into a Pavlovian population protocol
is not easy. It is not clear whether Pavlovian computable predicates are closed
by conjunctions: classical constructions for general population protocols can
not be used directly.
The power of Pavlovian population protocols is actually rather limited as
they can count up to 2, but not 3.
Theorem 3. There is no Pavlovian protocol that computes the threshold
predicate [x.σ ≥ 3], which is true when there are at least 3 occurrences of
input symbol σ in the input x.
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume there exists such a Pavlo-
vian protocol. Without loss of generality we may assume that Σ = {0,σ} is
a subset of the set of states Q.
As the protocol is Pavlovian, and hence symmetric, any rule qq → q0q00,
is such that q0 = q00, that is to say of the form qq → q0q0 for all q ∈ Q.
18Let then consider the sequence of rules such that σσ → q1q1 → q2q2 →
··· → qkqk → ... where σ,q1q2,q3,...,qk ∈ Q.
Since Q is ﬁnite, there exist two distinct integers k and ` such that qk = q`
and k < `.
The case k + 1 = ` is not possible. Indeed, we would have the rule
qkqk → qkqk. Consider the inputs x3 and x4 such that x3 = {σ,σ} and
x4 = {σ,σ,σ,σ}. x4 must be accepted. From x4 there is a derivation x4 →
{q1,q1,σ,σ} → {q1,q1,q1q1} →∗ {qk,qk,qk,qk}. This latter conﬁguration is
terminal from the above rule. Since x4 must be accepted, we must have
ω(qk) = 1. However, from x3 there is a derivation x3 → {q1,q1} →∗ {qk,qk},
where the last conﬁguration is also terminal. We reach a contradiction, since
its output would be ω(qk) = 1, whereas x3 must be rejected.
Hence, k + 1 < `, and qkqk → qk+1qk+1 → ··· → q`q` → qkqk. Let T be
then the set of states T = {qi : k ≤ i ≤ `}.
Since qiqi → qi+1qi+1 is among the rules, since the protocol is Pavlovian
with a matrix M, and by deﬁnition of Pavlov behavior, we must have qi+1 =
BR6=qi(qi) (with the convention that q`+1 is qk). So, BR(qi) can be qi+1 or qi.
Let then discuss the rules
qiqj → q
0
iq
0
j (12)
for qi,qj ∈ T.
There are three possibilities for the value of q0
i:
1. q0
i = qi if Mqiqj ≥ ∆
2. q0
i = qj, if Mqiqj < ∆ and if qj = BR6=qi(qj)
3. q0
i = qj+1 if Mqiqj < ∆ and if qj+1 = BR6=qi(qj)
In any case, we see that the value of q0
i is in T.
Symmetrically, we have three possibilities for q0
j, all of them in T.
Hence, all rules of the form (12) preserve T: we have q0
i,q0
j ∈ T, as soon
as qi,qj ∈ T.
Consider still then the inputs x3 and x4 such that x3 = {σ,σ} and
x4 = {σ,σ,σ,σ}. From x4 there is a derivation x4 → {q1,q1,σ,σ} →
{q1,q1,q1q1} →∗ {qk,qk,qk,qk}. From this last conﬁguration, by above re-
mark, the state of all agents will be in T. As x4 must be accepted, ultimately
all agents will be in states that belong to T whose image by ω is 1. Consider
now x3. From x3 there is a derivation x3 → {q1,q1} →∗ {qk,qk} that then
will go trough all conﬁgurations {qiqi}, for the qi ∈ T in turn. This can
19not eventually stabilize to elements whose image by ω is 0, as some of the
elements of T have image 1 by ω, and hence x3 is not accepted. This yields
a contradiction, and hence such a Pavlovian protocol can not exist.
7. The Power of Symmetric Population Protocols
Pavlovian Population protocols are symmetric. We just proved that they
have a very limited computational power. However, assuming population
protocols symmetric (not-necessarily Pavlovian) is not truly a restriction.
Proposition 6. Any population protocol can be simulated by a symmetric
population protocol, as soon as the population is of size ≥ 3.
Before proving this proposition, we state the (immediate) main conse-
quence.
Corollary 1. A predicate is computable by a symmetric population protocol
if and only if it is semilinear.
Proof. To a population protocol (Q,Σ,ι,ω,δ), with Q = {q1,··· ,qn} asso-
ciate population protocol (Q∪Q0,Σ,ι,ω,δ0) with Q0 = {q0
1,··· ,q0
n}, ω(q0) =
ω(q) for all q ∈ Q, and for all rules
qq → αβ
in δ, the following rules in δ0:

          
          
qq0 → αβ
q0q → βα
qq → q0q0
q0q0 → qq
qγ → q0γ
q0γ → qγ
γq → γq0
γq0 → γq
for all γ ∈ Q ∪ Q0,γ 6= q,γ 6= q0, and for all pairs of rules

qr → αβ
rq → δ
20with q,r ∈ Q, the following rules in δ0:

  
  
qr0 → αβ
r0q → βα
rq0 → δ
q0r → δ.
The obtained population protocol is clearly symmetric. Now the ﬁrst set
of rules guarantees that a state in Q can always be converted to its primed
version in Q0 and vice-versa. By fairness, whenever a rule qq → αβ (re-
spectively qr → αβ) can be applied, then the corresponding two ﬁrst rules
of the ﬁrst set of rules (resp. of the second set of rules) can eventually be
ﬁred after possibly some conversions of states into their primed version or
vice-versa.
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